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SKILL DECAY ON TAKEOFFS AS A RESULT OF VARYING DEGREES OF EXPECTANCY
Susan M. Stevens





University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico
It is generally assumed that skills trained and assessed in a simulator will transfer to the line.  However, there is a
class of maneuvers that demand an immediate response to an unexpected event (e.g., rejected takeoffs) for which
such transfer can be questioned and for which there is little or no empirical data to support a transfer assumption.
Thus, we have completed a series of studies aimed at investigating the effects of expectancy on performance for
unanticipated events in a laboratory situation with undergraduate college students and experienced pilots.  Our
participants were trained on both normal and rejected takeoffs and the expectancy for a rejected takeoff was
manipulated in each study.  There were two primary measures of performance on rejected takeoff trials: the amount
of time it took the participant to close down the throttle after engine failure and the maximum deviation from center
line achieved while bringing the aircraft to a stop.  T-tests indicated that there was a significant degradation in
throttle performance for both studies (all ps<.05) and in maximum deviation from center line performance for one of
the studies (p<.001).  Thus, it is questionable whether the assumption that performance on events that occur in high
expectancy conditions will transfer to low expectancy conditions is valid.
Introduction
Skill decay refers to the loss of trained or acquired
skills (or knowledge) after a period of nonuse (Arthur
et  al.,  1998).   The  literature  on  skill  decay  has
suggested that individuals in advanced fields requiring
complex skills (such as aviation) may suffer skill
decay due to various reasons including nonuse, heavy
cognitive load, poor situational awareness and stress
(Arthur et al., 1998; Childs & Spears, 1986; Lee &
Liu, 2003; Wickens, 2002).  Childs & Spears (1986)
found that cognitive/procedural skills decayed more
rapidly than did other types of skills in pilots.  Lee &
Liu (2003) found that pilots had a significantly higher
workload for takeoff and landing phases of flight.  In
addition, they found that the temporal demands for
takeoffs were rated significantly higher than any other
phases of flight, which the researchers noted could
impair pilot performance and lead to errors.
Skill decay and resulting errors may be especially
likely to occur in unexpected situations.  Wolfe et al
(2005) found that their participants failed to detect key
targets in a visual task when they only appeared
infrequently but not otherwise.  This finding has
particular implications for pilots in emergency
situations that require an immediate response (e.g.,
rejected takeoff; RTO).  One type of RTO occurs when
an engine fails prior to rotation speed.  The pilot must
abort the takeoff and quickly stop the plane on the
runway.  Although commercial pilots receive
extensive training and evaluation on emergency
maneuvers in simulators, they may fly their whole
careers without actually experiencing one.  How does
their performance on an unexpected emergency event
on the line compare with their performance on the
same event during a simulator evaluation?
In a series of studies, we investigated the effects of
expectancy on performance for an event (i.e. RTO) in
a laboratory task with both undergraduate college
students and experienced pilots.  Participants were
first trained to perform both normal and rejected
takeoffs on a PC-based flight simulator.  We then
tested their performance on a RTO during a
subsequent test session where we attempted to
decrease the expectancy of a RTO by providing a
long series of normal takeoffs (NTOs).  We
hypothesized that performance on the unexpected
event would decrease relative to their session one




Participants.  A total of one hundred forty seven
undergraduate students from the University of New
Mexico served as participants.  The students received
course credit for their participation.  None of the
students were pilots or had experience flying simulators.
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Materials. Microsoft’s Flight Simulator 2004
displayed on a personal computer was used to create
a well controlled laboratory task to study
performance on RTO’s.  The aircraft was a Boeing
737.  The task achieved at least some level of
realism.  Flight Simulator was supplemented with (a)
Adventure Basic Language Software Development
Kit (ABL) to control and monitor the flights, (b)
Flight Recorder for Microsoft Flight Simulator
(FLTREC 9.0) to record the flight parameter data,
and (c) Perl to run and coordinate the various
simulation components.  Participants used a yoke
(CH Products USB LE Flight Simulator Yoke
FSY208LE 200-608) and rudder pedals (CH Products
PRO Pedals USB PP99USB 300-111) to control the
aircraft.  Instructions were played via Windows
Media Player and were recorded (via Audacity) in a
male voice.  There were 4 different sets of
instructions; each set described what the participant
was to do in the various phases of the experiment.
Procedure. The participants were tested individually in
a small room.  The first set of instructions was played
(via Media Player) informing the participant about the
study and asking him to sign an informed consent.
After signing the informed consent, the second set of
instructions described the training session.  These
instructions explained the function of several cockpit
displays and controls of the aircraft in Flight Simulator
(i.e. yoke, throttle, rudder pedals, air speed indicator,
attitude indicator and altimeter).  The experimenter
pointed out the different controls as the instructions
described them.  Next, the participant was informed
that he would perform a series of NTOs.  A normal
takeoff consisted of taking off and then turning the
aircraft.  Each trial started with the plane on the
runway, engines running and ready for takeoff.  The
altitude of the runway was 440 feet and the heading
was 160 degrees.  Once the participant released the
brake and engaged the throttle, a text message was
displayed indicating the takeoff speed (either 145 or
155 knots), the turn altitude (the minimum altitude at
which the turn should be initiated; always 1000 feet)
and the heading (140 degrees for a left turn or 180
degrees for a right turn).  The takeoff speeds and turn
direction were randomized and balanced across the 40
flights.  The participant was asked to stay as close to
the centerline as possible while traveling down the
runway.  After takeoff, the participant was told
whether or not he took off at the correct speed.  After
the specified heading was reached, the program
stopped and reset itself for another trial.  The
participant performed 10 NTOs.
Once the participant completed the NTOs, a third set
of instructions described how to perform a RTO.  A
RTO trial  began the  same as  a  NTO trial  but  before
the plane reached the designated rotation speed, one
of  the  engines  failed  at  120,  125 or  135 knots.   The
speed at which an engine failed and which engine
(left or right) failed was randomized and balanced
across the trials.  The participant was informed to
close  down  the  throttle  as  quickly  as  possible  and
then to steer and brake the plane to keep it as close to
the centerline as possible.  Once the plane came to a
complete stop, the program stopped and reset itself
for another trial.  The participant performed 15
RTOs.  One average, session one took forty five
minutes to complete.  After the participant completed
these training trials, he was told he could take a break
if he desired (most people declined).
A final set of instructions informed the participant
about the next session.  The participants were divided
into three groups that received different instructions;
this  was  the  manipulation  of  expectancy.   The  first
group (group A; N = 62) was simply told that the
next set of flights would be similar to the previous.
No other information was given.  The second group
(group B; N = 42) was told that they would be
performing another set of takeoffs but would not
know when an engine failure might occur.  The third
group (group C; N = 43) heard the same instructions
as  the  second  group  but  was  also  warned  prior  to
each test RTO that a RTO would occur on that trial.
All of the participants performed 15 trials in this last
session; 13 NTOs followed by 2 RTOs.
Results
Several measures of the participants’ performance on
the RTOs were obtained (e.g. stopping time, stopping
distance) but response time to shut down the throttle
after engine failure and maximum distance off center
line were used for statistical analysis.  Extreme
throttle and off center values were scaled such that
throttle values above 6 seconds were eliminated and
center line values over 65 feet were scaled to 65 feet.
As a result of the throttle scaling, three participant’s
data from group A and one participant’s data from
group B were not included in the analysis.  The last 5
RTOs during training were averaged for each
participant to establish baseline performance
measures.  These baseline measures were compared
to the participant’s performance on first RTO of the
test session.  The results are shown in Tables 1 and 2.
For group A, a paired t-test revealed a significant
throttle effect t(58) = 5.38, p<.001 and a significant
center line effect t(61) = 3.05, p<.001 indicating that
the participants performed significantly worse during
the unexpected RTO in the second session.
Additional t-tests for the group A throttle effect using
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three alternate scaling methods (all latencies over 6
scaled to 6, removal of all participants with latencies
over 6 and a log transform) produced similar results.
For group B, a paired t-test revealed a significant
throttle effect t(40) = 4.91, p <.001 but no significant
center line effect t(41) = .16, p>.05.  For group C, no
significant throttle effects were found t(42) = .92,
p>.05.  Significant center line effects were found
t(42) = -3.13, p<.001 but were in the opposite
direction indicating that the participants’ center line
performance in the test session was significantly
better than their baseline performance.
Table 1. Mean response time to shut down throttle






















































Study 1 showed a significant degradation in
performance on an unexpected RTO in comparison to
performance demonstrated during training.  We
wondered to what extent the results might be limited




Participants. Fourteen pilots from Double Eagle
Airport in Albuquerque, NM served as participants.
They were compensated for their participation.  The
pilots had an average of 720 hours of flying
experience.
Materials.  The materials were the same as those
used for Study 1.
Procedure.  The procedure was the same as in Study
1 except  that  the  pilots  received a  shorter  version  of
the first set of instructions due to their familiarity
with the equipment.  The pilots received the same
final set of instructions as group A in Study 1.
Results
The  data  were  scaled  in  the  same  way  as  Study  1.
None of  the  pilots  had  extreme throttle  scores  so  all
were retained in the analysis.  Performance was
computed  in  the  same way as  Study 1  (see  Tables  1
and 2).  A paired t-test revealed a significant throttle
effect t(13) = 2.18, p<.05 but an insignificant center
line effect t(13) = .46, p>.05.
Discussion
The results from both studies indicated that
performance can significantly degrade as a function
of expectancy. Both actual pilots and students were
slower to close down the throttle on an unexpected
RTO.  In addition, the students deviated more from
center line in the test RTO condition. The pilots were
clearly superior to the students in maneuvering the
plane to a stop once an engine failed.  However, once
they recognized that the engine failed, there was little
decrement in their maneuvering skills.
The results are at least suggestive that actual line pilots
may not respond as well to emergency events on the line
as they do in simulator sessions.  Some corroboration of
these results comes from studies of first-look maneuver
performance of commercial pilots.  Hendrickson et al
(2006) found that pilots’ performance on unexpected
first-look maneuvers was slightly worse (but statistically
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